Seeing Sheykh Mevlana on a trip to Cyprus is a very blessed but also a very fleeting moment.
His sohbets (talks) are broadcast from his home into the Lefke Dergah on a projector screen. People who travel far and wide see Maulana very briefly. Mevlana also does not come from the house for prayer at the Dergah. To catch a glimpse of him one must wait by his home for some time, where he enters a car after Asr Namaz to be driven to some places in Cyprus. Between that moment of exiting the home and entering the car, one might be so fortunate to be able to see him and kiss his hand.
So one can imagine that is was highly unusual, and also a very blessed event, when Sheykh Mevlana came to Sheykh Abdul Kerim’s house in Cyprus to visit him.
There Mevlana officiated the opening of a dergah at this temporary location. Mevlana also gave of his own land to Sheykh Abdul Kerim to use for a permanent location.
Sheykh Abdul Kerim was a gracious host and showed Sheykh Mevlana the dergah and made him very comfortable. Sheykh Mevlana Nazim prayed two rakats immediately. Then Sheykh Abdul Kerim showed Sheykh Mevlana his Ziyarat (visitation) to Grandshaykhs in India, and events at the Osmanli Dergah in New York.
Sheykh Mevlana was also able to meet murids individually who were staying at the dergah, giving us all a rare opportunity to be in the presence of Sultan ul Awliya Sheykh Muhammad Nazim Adil al-Hakkani.
One day a contumacious man, who was ignorant of the reverence due to Allah, said to Murtaza (Ali (R)),
On the top of an exceedingly high terrace or pavilion, “Art thou conscious of Allah’s protection, O intelligent man?”
“Yes,” he replied ; “He is the Protector and the Self-sufficient for preserving my existence from the time of infancy and conception.”
He said, “Come cast thyself down from the roof, put an entire confidence in the protection of God,
So that thy sure faith and thy goodly proven conviction may become evident to me.”
Then the Prince said to him, “Be silent, go, lest for this boldness thy soul be pawed (given over to perdition).”
How is it right for a servant (of Allah) to venture on an experiment with Allah by making trial of Him?
How should a servant of Allah have the stomach vain-gloriously to put Him to the test, O mad fool?
To Allah alone belongs that right, who brings forward a test for His servants at every moment,
In order that He may show us plainly to ourselves (and reveal) what beliefs we hold in secret.
Did Adam (AS) ever say to Allah, “I made trial of Thee in committing this sin and trespass,
That I might see the utmost limit of Thy clemency, O King?” Ah, who would be capable of seeing this, who?
Forasmuch as your understanding is confused, your excuse is worse than your crime.
How can you make trial of Him who raised aloft the vault of heaven?
O you that have not known good and evil, (first) make trial of yourself, and then of others.
When you have made trial of yourself, O such-and-such, you will be unconcerned with making trial of others.
When you have come to know you are a grain of sugar, then you will know that you belong to the sugar house.
Know, then, without making any trial, that (if) you are sugar, Allah will not send you to the wrong place.
Without making trial, know this of the King’s (Allah’s) knowledge: when you are a spritiual chief, He will not send you down to the vestibule.
Does any intelligent man let a precious pearl fall into the midst of a privy full of ordure?
Inasmuch as a sagacious and attentive man will nowise send wheat to a star barn,
If a novice has made trial of the Shaykh who is the (spiritual) leader and guide, he is an ass.
If you make trial of him in the way of religion, you will be tried( by tribulation), O man without faith.
Your audacity and ignorance will become naked and exposed to view: how should he be naked by that scrutiny?
If the mote come and weight the mountain, its scales will be shattered by the mountain, O youth;
For he(the novice) applies the scales of his own judgment and puts the man of God in the scales ;
But since he (the Shaykh) is not contained by the scales of intellect, consequently he shatters the scales of intellect.
Know that to make trial of him is like exercising authority over him: do not seek to exercise authority over such a spiritual king.
What authority should the pictures desire to exercise over such an Artist for the purpose of testing Him?
If it(the picture) has known and experienced any trial, is it not the case that the Artist brought that (trial) upon it?
Indeed, this form that He fashioned – what is it worth in comparison with the forms which are in His knowledge?
When the temptation to make this trial has come to you, know that ill fortune has come and smitten your neck.
When you feel such a temptation, at one, turn to Allah and begin the prostration.
Make the place of prostration wet with flowing tears and say, “O Allah, do Though deliver me from this doubt!”
At the time when it is your object to make trial of Allah, the mosque, namely, your religion, becomes filled with kharrub (carob)
Maulana Rumi (ks) – Mathnwai Volume 4 (353)
A no-win situation for ‘Modern Muslims’ reading history – If the Sultans treat Sheykhs and Islam with respect, the Sheykhs are maligned.
Excerpted from Mukhtasar al-Quduri, a highly revered manual of Hanafi fiqh -
In Sunan Ibn Majah and elsewhere is the account of a Sahabi who was teaching writing and Qur’an to a man of the people of the Suffah. Later on, the man gave Mu`adh a bow. Mu`adh thought that there is nothing wrong in taking it, and besides, he will use it for fighting in the path of Allah, but he was still uncertain so he thought to ask the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace). The Prophet told him that “if you want it (the bow) to be girdled around your neck with fire on the Day of Resurrection, then take it.”
Based on this hadith, the authentic view of the Hanafi school is that it is prohibited to take money for teaching of Qur’an. This is the more precautionary view, and is in keeping with the apparent sense of the hadith. The Shafi`is, however, reasoned that the reason for the prohibition issued to Mu`adh here was that they had not fixed any price for the teaching, and that Mu`adh had therefore been teaching only for the sake of reward in the Hereafter, such that if he were to take a material payment, this would reduce or annul his reward. So, they said there is no harm in taking payment if the price was arranged beforehand. They also drew support from the hadith where a group of Companions took a payment of food for ruqyah (curing someone by reciting verses of the Qur’an). The Hanafis respond that this hadith is an evidence for the permissibility of taking payment for ruqyah, but not for teaching the Qur’an.
The hadith does not apply to selling of Islamic books and other materials; it is specifically about _teaching_. Even selling the Qur’an (muSHaf) is not Haram, (except according to a view of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal), but it is makrooh. Although, the salaf used to shy away from accepting money for books and the like also, and this is undoubtedly more precautionary, so as to reserve all reward for the Hereafter. Yet, if someone is making a living by selling books, then there is no harm in charging a profit, w’Allahu a`lam.
The issue of teachers and schools raises another point. As I have mentioned, the authentic view of the madhhab is that taking a fee for teaching Qur’an is Haram. However, later on when Islam became weaker, and the state no longer took the same care of the religion and its people, such that the `ulama and teachers of the Qur’an were no longer provided for by the state, these people came into dire circumstances. They had no source of income, and no education or training (other than religious sciences) which they could use to earn a living. It was quite literally a matter of life and death for them. Under these situations, fatwa was given in the madhhab on the permissibility of taking payment for teaching Qur’an, since necessity dictates exceptions and makes the prohibited temporarily permissible. Ibn `Abidin has mentioned this in sharH `uqood rasm al-muftee.
It should be note, however, that this was a specific fatwa for a specific situation, and that the authentic view of the madhhab remains one of prohibition of accepting payment. So, if a person is in such dire circumstances, with no other way out, he could take by this fatwa then and accept some payment. If no such mitigating circumstances exist, it remains prohibited. w’Allahu a`lam.
The reality is today it is possible to live a mediocre lifestyle with a job that requires very little training.
Are we in the life or death situation today that has made charging for ‘Islamic knowledge’ permissible? Or, do we really believe it is a life or death situation for our scholars to be able to afford macbook pro’s?
While the above excerpt mentions the two categories of teaching Quran and charging for the text, the reality is when teaching Islam *you are teaching Quran*. What did ‘teaching Quran’ mean in a society where everyone spoke Arabic? It meant understanding, developing of knowledge based on the Quran and its lessons. This prohibition clearly applied to the entire field of Islamic study, much less the very explicit study of tajweed and qirat.
Later jurists have extended the permission (of payment) to similar duties like leading the prayer (imamah), calling for prayers (adhan), teaching Hadith and Fiqh, etc., for they are related to the teaching of the Holy Qur’an, and survival of Islam equally depends on them.”
[Mufti Muhammad Shafi, Ma'ariful Qur'an, Vol. 1, p191]
In the above excerpt, it is interesting to note how the wording of the exception is to ‘accept some payment’ vs demand some payment. With expensive books and classes, Muslims in the pursuit of ‘Islamic knowledge’ have created a subculture that excludes the poor and the unread. Some Sheykhs of the ‘spiritual sciences’ charge even for their sohbet. Now we even have major islamic ‘conferences’ with “pay-per-view“.
Why aren’t all these books and tapes available online for free? Empire building.
The new industry of disseminating ‘Islamic knowledge’ or, in modern days called ‘Sacred knowledge’, has reached a new peak. Any and all stigma related to collecting of personal money under the name of Islam has been lost. Instead of doing it quietly, with discretion, it is now brazen and up-front. What is the wisdom in the Hanafi position above, which ruled over Muslims for centuries? A personal examination will demonstrate quite a few lessons.
It is reported by Jabir that the Prophet said: The flesh and body that is raised on unlawful sustenance shall not enter Paradise. Hell is more deserving to the flesh that grows on one’s body out of unlawful sustenance. (Ahmad).
Criticism of “Why I am not a Traditionalist” – Part 1
Definitions and Perennialism
In 2002 “Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen” wrote an article “Why I am not a Traditionalist.“ This article has resonated with some readers. Of course, this article and works like it (i.e. Against the Modern World, Sedwick) cannot compare in effectiveness to the continued adoration of vast communities to traditional approaches towards faith and living.
Still, it raises issues which merit a response to those who are quick to label traditional approaches as ‘perennial philosophy’ and cast traditional life and faith aside.
Legenhausen begins with an introduction and a section entitled “Traditionalism or Modernism?” In these sections he asserts his conclusion is not an endorsement of modernism. He believes that “both Traditionalism and modernism should be rejected”, since both simply accept claims by virtue of the fact that they are at odds with its opponent. In his view, a modernist is a modernist because he does the opposite of traditionalists and traditionalists are the same in reverse. As a substitute to these dueling polar approaches towards life, he offers what appears to be a very measured response: “Every claim and every practice must be subject to critical evaluation according to the criteria of religion and reason.”
The claim that Legenhausen is somehow the best discerner of religion and reason is a distraction from the real discussion. The reality is reason and religion are used by everyone to come to some level of truth. I have yet to meet a modernist who believes mass literacy should be pursued because it is merely the polar opposite of largely illiterate traditional societies. No, the fact is that numerous ‘reasonable’ motives are given for each and every action they take.
The introduction to this article, as well as the article itself, suggest numerous times that ‘Traditionalism’ is a modern invention. The article states, “Traditionalism is a modern European reaction against modernism” and “Traditionalism is a paradoxically modern reaction against modernism whose roots are to be found in 19th century Europe, especially France”. This is a flawed ad hominem tu quoque argument, which holds that since those who espouse traditional ideas are living in the modern age, the very nature of the beliefs they carry are a reaction to modernity. The argument falls flat on its face, even with its constant repetition aside.
Islamic Traditionalists are called such because they are carrying a living tradition, regardless of what modernity has brought to replace it. Was this tradition not in existence before Western modernity? Hence, the best and most clear traditional teachers of Islam are not “Rene Guenon” who turned from modernity, but rather those like Rene Guenon’s Sufi teacher and the lineage (silsila) that the Sufi path that Guenon followed until the day he died. Unlike Western ‘traditionalists’ who were espousing ideas of resurrecting traditional papal authority, Islamic Tradition never ‘died out’. So how can it be swept aside as a reactionary understanding?
The need to resort to such techniques simply underscores the major flaw when trying to fit Islamic perspectives into a neat Western box in order to criticize it. Yes, it is clear that from a Western European perspective, like the one Legenhausen is speaking from, embracing a Sufi tarikat (in the same vein as so-called ‘perennialists’ such as Lings, Guenon, and Burckhardt) would have been a rejection of a European modernity, which they were raised in, for an Islamic Traditionalism. However, to consider that Islamic Traditionalism existed as ‘reactions to modernity’ on the part of the billions of Muslims who over history have been fortunate enough to be born into such a path is clearly a representation of a consistent Western hegemony in academic discourse.
According to the article’s definition, modernity is a ‘cultural condition’. If modernity is a cultural condition, then it must be absolutely clear that the Islamic world, for a large part, has not been completely consumed in modern culture. If one is unaware that traditional Islamic societies are still alive, quite oblivious to the high-minded academic discourse going on in the West, one needs only to visit the rural areas of most Muslim countries. Even within the major cities traditional paths to faith and living have hardly been completely abandoned. There is a reason why ‘under-developed’ and ‘third-world’ are the adjectives that describe much of the living situations of Muslims.
The Euro-centric view continues in the definition of tradition, which Legenhausen describes as “confusing” to define. The article states,
“To call a non-Western society traditional is therefore to claim that it is similar in important ways to Europe before the Reformation. In contrast to modernism, traditionalism could be used to designate any movement of resistance to modernization, or the view that pre-modern societies are superior to modernized societies.”
This understanding can be clearly seen as a intellectual cop-out, as its clear that there must be key factors to traditional society that exist and help define them in their own right. While traditionalism is again defined as a resistance to modernization, wouldn’t it be better to investigate the living principles that traditionalists hold that are being infringed upon by modernization and understand the dispute regarding these principles?
When describing Islamic Traditionalism Legenhausen states it is sourced from “Rene Guenon and Ananda Coomaraswamy”. Rene Guenon led a life of many philosophies and finally took initiation in the Shadhili Sufi Tarikat and died as a Sufi Muslim while Ananda Coomaraswamy was a Hindu. If we are defining “Islamic Traditionalist” as the philosophies of early Guenon and Coomaraswamy, then its clear that no traditionalist Muslim can really be considered an “Islamic Traditionalist”.
So we end up with two ‘Traditionalists’, one group represented in those sufi Sheykhs whom most of these European converts flocked to as students and then the 20th century European convert students themselves. The first group has been a connected chain of teachers and students holding Islamic traditional principles high for over 1400 years, and the second group has largely passed on, leaving behind a legacy of works which documented their thinking on their individual steps towards accepting Islam. The result of these works enchanted much of the Orientalist West with a new perspective. Which one is Legenhausen arguing against?
It depends.
The need for Legenhausen to initially box ‘Islamic Traditionalism’ to a convert European philosopher and a Hindu is necessary in order to introduce Legenhausen’s rebuttal to broad pluralistic viewpoints. It should also be considered that Legenhausen wrote a rather long published work attacking religious pluralism, so this article provides another outlet for his thesis. These broad pluralistic viewpoints allowed Guenon, Lings and others to learn about Islam to the point that they adopted it as their final faith in a long journey of soul seeking. However, at the end of their journeys, how pluralist were these core 20th century (non-Hindu) ‘Islamic Perennialists’ (Guenon, Lings, Burckhardt) really? How far was this pluralism from the pluralism which is inherent in the Quranic views of other faiths?
Guenon, while labeled a ‘Perennialist’, ended his life saying ‘Allah!’ and wrote a scathing condemnation of theosophy and other such philosophies. No ‘Islamic Traditionalist’, even if you consider Guenon among them, are such excessive religious pluralists as their opponents make them out to be. They found philosophies and aspects of different faiths that they vastly disagreed with. And therefore what we have for most of the article is another flawed argument structure: the strawman.
Even though Legenhausen agrees that Guenon rejected Theosophical principles, he later equates Guenon’s Perennial viewpoint to the Theosophical understandings of Blavatsky. “Even if Guénon decisively rejected the Theosophical Society, the key ideas of the Traditionalists regarding the unity of religions… are clearly stated by Madame Blavatsky in the introduction to The Secret Doctrine”.
What’s wrong with the sort of pluralism advocated by Blavatsky and the Traditionalists is that it depends on a rather questionable reading of the texts of the world’s religions. It requires that one hold that certain similarities in doctrine, especially esoteric doctrine, constitute the core of the religions, and that differences be dismissed as deviations. Blavatsky supported this interpretation with the dubious claim that she had discovered the original secret teachings. The Traditionalists, on the other hand, claim that through intellectual intuition they are able to discern the common essence. The method used is implausible. It is assumed at the outset that the religions have a common esoteric essence, and the texts are interpreted so as to accord with this principle. This is question begging.
However, isn’t this the very core of the Islamic teaching about other faiths? If a ‘Perennialist’ is someone who believes that prophets were sent to all nations and that most faiths have deviated one extent to another from a core of Islam that those prophets brought, then I believe all Muslims are ‘Perennialists’. Sheykh al Akbar Ibn Arabi (R) was asked about how to treat Christians by the Sultan, and his reply:
“The religious laws (shara’i') are all lights, and the law of Muhammad (Allah bless him and give him peace) among these lights is as the sun’s light among the light of the stars: if the sun comes out, the lights of the stars are no longer seen and their lights are absorbed into the light of the sun: the disappearance of their lights resembles what, of the religious laws, has been abrogated (nusikha) by his law (Allah bless him and give him peace) despite their existence, just as the lights of the stars still exist. This is why we are required by our universal law to believe in all prophetic messengers (rusul) and to believe that all their laws are truth, and did not turn into falsehood by being abrogated: that is the imagination of the ignorant. So all paths return to look to the Prophet’s path (Allah bless him and give him peace): if the prophetic messengers had been alive in his time, they would have followed him just as their religious laws have followed his law.
This view of measured ‘pluralism’ was not dependent on Guenon or Coomaraswamy, this was an integral part of Islamic teaching from the very beginning! Legenhausen then criticizes Martin Lings comments about the Hindu caste system, associating him with the pluralism of new-age philosophies:
“Traditionalists such as Martin Lings continue to defend the Hindu caste system as being a part of authentic tradition, rather than condemning it on the basis of Islamic teachings.”
This selective reading of Martin Lings neglects to point out that even his understanding of the Hindu faith was predicated on the necessity of the elimination of the caste system, to achieve a “Golden Age”. Specifically Martin Lings says, “The Golden Age is by definition an age when men are ‘above caste’” (Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions). Hence while it is debateable whether Martin Lings actively sought out to condemn this or that aspect of other faiths (which is really a modernist way to behave), it is clear that he sought to demonstrate that there was a recognition of the superiority of Islamic principles within the Hindu tradition. Avid polemicist Ahmad Deedat did just this to even greater extents, yet one finds few looking to call him a deviated ‘perennialist’.
[continued]
yursil on 
Andrew Hasin on 
Aaminah on 